Who are you?
How do you know?
Here are some of the things I’m working on right now.
[a paper about qualia knowledge]
(Title redacted for blind review.) Presumably, you know you’re not a philosophical zombie. You know this because you, unlike a zombie, have qualia. You know what it’s like to feel a cool breeze, to see the color red. How do you know your qualia? I say you know your qualia, in good cases, in the same way you know facts about the external world.
Most of the time, you know your own mind in a special, first-personal way. What exactly is this special way? I argue that you know your attitudes toward things in the same way you know the camera’s relative position to the objects in a photograph. The camera doesn’t have to be in the picture in order to give away where it is with respect to the objects represented.
De se Discontent: getting the de se out of content
Most people think that, if there is something distinctive about self-locating (de se) beliefs, that whatever is distinctive must be located in the content of the belief. I think this is too quick. Instead, we can find the special de se character of de se belief not in the content of the belief, but in the belief itself, qua vessel of content.