Who are you?

How do you know?

Your history, your relationships, your commitments, your joys, your tendencies, your values: all of these things help make you who you are.

The thing that I think makes you who you are more than anything else, though, is your point of view. How do you see the world? What do you see as being centrally important, and what do you take to be merely peripheral? Your perspectival stance, your worldview, is both something you adopt and something you inhabit. It is what makes you who you are. 

How do you know how you see the world? My answer, here, is perhaps deceptively straightforward: you know how you see the world by looking at the world.


In Print

“Common Sense in Metaphysics”. 2020. Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy. Rik Peels and RenĂ© Van Woudenberg (eds.), Cambridge University Press.

Why think that departure from common sense is something we ought to avoid when doing metaphysics? I think the answer depends a lot on what we think metaphysics is. According to my preferred meta-metaphysical stance (metaphysics as modeling) we have both epistemic and non-epistemic reasons to prefer commonsensical metaphysical views. 


In Progress

Here are some of the things I’m working on right now.



[a paper about qualia knowledge]

(Title redacted for blind review.) Presumably, you know you’re not a philosophical zombie. You know this because you, unlike a zombie, have qualia. You know what it’s like to feel a cool breeze, to see the color red. How do you know your qualia? I say you know your qualia, in good cases, in the same way you know facts about the external world.

Perspectival self-knowledge

Most of the time, you know your own mind in a special, first-personal way. What exactly is this special way? I argue that you know your attitudes toward things in the same way you know the camera’s relative position to the objects in a photograph. The camera doesn’t have to be in the picture in order to give away where it is with respect to the objects represented.

De se Discontent: getting the de se out of content

Most people think that, if there is something distinctive about self-locating (de se) beliefs, that whatever is distinctive must be located in the content of the belief. I think this is too quick. Instead, we can find the special de se character of de se belief not in the content of the belief, but in the belief itself, qua vessel of content.